Northern Ireland’s devolved administration over-reached itself when it launched its version of the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) scheme, according to a damning report into the province’s “cash for ash” scandal, which has been published today (13 March).
The report, which runs to 56 chapters and 656 pages, outlines the findings of the long running inquiry into the failure of the Northern Ireland non-domestic RHI, which triggered the collapse of the Stormont power sharing executive in January 2017.
It includes 44 recommendations based on 319 critical findings which were gleaned from the evidence presented over the 114 days of hearings.
The inquiry’s remit covers the design and implementation of the RHI scheme; how it operated; the circumstances relating to the imposition of cost controls in late 2015 and those surrounding the suspension of the scheme to new applicants early in the following year.
The scheme was run by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), which later turned into the Department for the Economy (DfE).
The RHI was set up in November 2012 to provide financial incentives for businesses in Northern Ireland to move away from using non-renewable sources of energy.
It was suspended in February 2016 and has not been re-opened to further applications after it emerged that the scheme had overspent to the tune of £700 million.
The current first minister for Northern Ireland, Arlene Foster, held departmental responsibility for the RHI when the scheme was being developed.
The report concludes the RHI scheme was a “project too far” and while motivated by the laudable aim of encouraging the use of renewables rather than fossil fuels in heat production, Northern Ireland’s stand-alone scheme should never have been adopted.
It says: “The NI RHI scheme was novel, technically complex and potentially volatile, especially because of its demand-led nature and the wide range of variables – such as fluctuating fuel costs – which could affect its operation.
“These features together made the scheme highly risky, yet the risks were not sufficiently understood by all those who should have understood them within the Northern Ireland government, either at the outset or any time during the life of the scheme.
“Without the necessary resources and capability, DETI should never have embarked on such a novel and complicated, demand-led scheme.
“Responsibility for what went wrong lay not just with one individual or group, but with a broad range of persons and organisations involved, across a variety of areas relating to the design, approval, management and administration of the NI RHI scheme throughout its life.
“Across those different areas, there was a multiplicity of errors and omissions…There were repeated missed opportunities to identify and correct, or seek to have others correct, the flaws in the scheme.
“The sad reality is that, in addition to a significant number of individual shortcomings, the very governance, management and communication systems, which in these circumstances should have provided early warning of impending problems and fail-safes against such problems, proved inadequate.”
The inquiry’s recommendations will be monitored and implemented Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland, Mr Kieran Donnelly who will monitor and, as necessary, pursue the effective implementation.