With similar lifecycle emissions compared to all the major forms of renewable energy, nuclear power will play an important role in shaping the world’s future supply. However, there is a need to create a unanimous and unambiguous set of international safety regulations. A consistent set of standards would unite the current set of national frameworks to reduce the cost of developing future facilities and improve the level of safety standards.
This year marks the fifth anniversary of Fukushima. The iconic footage of the Fukushima nuclear power plant explosion will remain in the public consciousness forever. Analysis of the accident showed that after the tsunami caused a power outage, degraded seals at the nuclear plant burst under high temperatures and pressures.
One may wonder why the degradation of seals has not been more of a serious issue for regulators. In 1982, the American Nuclear Society published a report stating that the higher temperatures and pressures symptomatic of an accident can cause old organic polymer seals to burst. Despite this finding, regulatory inconsistency still allows for the continued use of older, organic seals in today’s reactors.
More must be done to advance nuclear energy safety and the first step forward is to recognise the inherent weakness of existing and planned reactor structures.
Applying the lessons learnt
The commissioning of the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) at Hinkley Point C serves as an important test for the companies involved to prove that they can deliver economically viable EPR technology in the UK. The technological, operational and design-related issues facing the reactor are well understood.
Over-budget and delayed, the setbacks are indistinguishable from the problems faced by its parent reactor and flagship plant in Flamanville. Additionally, recent reports have shown that, in Finland, operator TVO does not have the reassurances from suppliers that its Olkiluoto EPR project will have the necessary resources to begin generating by 2018 as planned.
Cambridge University academic Tony Roulstone likened the schematic planning of Hinkley to “building a cathedral within a cathedral”, going so far as to label it “unconstructable”. Such multifaceted plants come with serious design challenges, but essentially, each uses the same reactor technology.
Safety standards are independently governed by national regulatory authorities. Such is the point of differentiation between safety requirements from one country to another, budget delays, complications and over-customisation are unavoidable. In this instance, it would be beneficial for each reactor to abide by uniform safety regulations.
For structures of this scale, practices should be universally adhered to, ensuring that each element of construction complies with the strictest international safety standards. With this, the industry can have an undisputed foundation across the globe.
The most pertinent issue facing the industry is the inevitability of problems that arise from the confusion of international safety regulations. Nuclear safety is open to interpretation. For example, the stance of UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation on elements of safety, promotes the principle of “defence in depth”. This approach requires licensees and contractors of a facility to analyse fault sequences leading to severe accidents in order to identify any additional equipment that may be needed and to ensure realistic guidance on the actions to be taken is available.
Meanwhile, the World Nuclear Association (WNA) has clear guidelines on the safety of power reactors and their components, acknowledging that the properties of some materials can be changed by heat and radiation over time.
Minimising maintenance costs
Steam generators are the most prominent and expensive of components that must be replaced after 30 years. However, with the right parts, these generators have the potential to run for up to 60 years. Lesser components are more straightforward to replace as they age, and some may be safety-related as well as economic.
A key aspect to the WNA’s approach to safety is the high-quality design and construction of the plants and equipment that prevent operational issues or human failure or errors developing into problems. Also, comprehensive monitoring and regular testing to detect equipment or operator failures are required. Many diverse systems to control damage to the nuclear fuel and prevent significant radioactive releases are essential. There should also be more stringent provision to confine the effects of severe fuel damage, or other problems, to the plant itself.
This is all very well, but such is the level of dispute of regulations between national regulatory bodies that a more objective safety standard is needed to establish consistent and approved standards and open up the market to fairer competition.
Companies have been using the same components for 50 years, and lack of competition can equate to a deficiency in product improvement as well as keep costs high. The “cloak and dagger” approach of internalising information runs contrary to the nuclear safety aims deemed to be correct following both the Fukushima, and to an extent, Chernobyl, accidents where a lack of openness contributed to a poor nuclear safety culture.
Standard safety requirements for the sector and suppliers – from component solutions to containment buildings – across the globe should be indispensable ambitions in order for the world’s nations to meet their nuclear power expansion targets. Government bodies across the globe must translate the need for a uniform and industry-wide policy that can form the framework for future power plants. With decarbonisation goals set by global legislation, low-carbon alternatives – both renewable and nuclear – are the only logical and economical alternatives to keep the earth’s lights on, and it is up to us as an industry to keep the pillars of safety out of the dark.